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Preliminary Injunction of
Arbitration Proceedings
Six Clinics Holding Corporation,H v. Cafcomp Systems, Inc.'

I. INTRODUCTION
The issue presented in Six ClinicsHolding Corporation,I v. Cafcomp Systems,
Inc., is whether a court is prohibited from issuing a preliminary injunction in a case
subject to arbitration.' The parties had a private agreement to arbitrate any disputes,
but the court enjoined the arbitration in order to determine a federal issue outside the
arbitrator's jurisdiction The defendant argued that the Anti-Injunction Act, which
prohibits federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings, was violated.4
However, the court found a loophole by stating that a private arbitration is not a state
proceeding and thus is not governed by the Act.5 This escape hatch is an all too easy
method to avoid the Anti-Injunction Act's purpose and strictly construed exceptions.
By allowing a preliminary injunction of an arbitration proceeding, the Six Clinics
court has diluted the strength and effect of alternative dispute resolution methods like
arbitration.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Defendant, Cafcomp, Inc. (Cafcomp), is an employee benefits administration
company that provides comprehensive cafeteria plan services which permit certain
tax exemptions for employees. 6 Six Clinics Holding Corporation II, previously
known as American Rehabilitation Network (ARN), is a Michigan corporation that
provides several physical and occupational therapy services and facilities in Detroit.7
In August 1992, Cafcomp's Chief Executive Officer and President, Lenza Reaves,
met with ARN and recommended two cafeteria plans.' ARN decided to use the
Pay+PLUSTM Plan and entered into an agreement with Cafcomp on October 9,
1992. 9 The agreement detailed the plan's services, the two-year term, and included
an arbitration clause for any claim arising out of the agreement or breach of the
agreement. 10

1. 119 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 1997).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 396.
4. Id. at 397.
5. Id. at 398.
6. Id. at 396.
7. Id. On June 12, 1997, American Rehabilitation Network filed notice of a Change of Name to Six
Clinics Holding Corporation, II. The opinion uses ARN since the corporation used this name during the
events giving rise to this litigation.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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In the fall of 1993, ARN questioned Cafcomp about the legality of the plan and
subsequently terminated the agreement on November 22, 1993." On March 3, 1994,
Cafcomp filed an arbitration notice with the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) for breach of agreement by ARN and sought damages in excess of
$250,000.2 On September 6, 1994, ARN filed an arbitration counterclaim alleging
that the cafeteria plan was a violation of the Internal Revenue Code and a breach of
Cafcomp's fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA).13 In January 1995, Cafcomp filed a motion for summary disposition
and defenses because the arbitration court lacked
to dismiss the ERISA counterclaim
4
subject matter jurisdiction.'
ARN responded to Cafcomp's motion by filing an action in federal court on
February 1, 1995, claiming that Cafcomp had violated its fiduciary duties under
ERISA.' 5 It simultaneously asked the arbitration panel to stay arbitration until the
federal suit was resolved.' 6 The arbitration panel refused to delay the proceedings
and dismissed ARN's counterclaims on February 6, 1995, stating that it lacked
jurisdiction. 7
On April 11, 1995, ARN filed an action in district court seeking a stay of
arbitration or, alternatively, that the proceedings remain open until the federal suit
was resolved. 8 On May 10, 1995, the district court concluded that ARN would
likely prevail in federal court and granted ARN's motion for preliminary
injunction.' 9 Cafcomp appealed the district court's decision arguing that the court
did not have authority to delay the arbitration action under the Anti-Injunction Act
which prohibits federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings.2" The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals affmned the district court's decision to grant a preliminary
injunction.2'
The primary issue on appeal was whether this arbitration proceeding was a state
court proceeding in which case the court would be prohibited from ordering an
injunction under the Anti-Injunction Act.22 The Court of Appeals concluded that the
Anti-Injunction Act does not apply to arbitration proceedings in that arbitration is a
private and voluntary proceeding in which the state courts may never become
involved. 23 Therefore, the district court has authority to grant preliminary injunctions

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. The specific statutory rules relating to cafeteria plans and tax exemptions are in the Internal
Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 125.
14. Id.
Under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (e)(1), the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction of such claims.
15. Id. at 397.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. The Anti-Injunction Act provides: "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction
to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
21. Id.
at 398.
22. Id.
23. Id.
at 399.
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to stay arbitration proceedings.24 On secondary issues of whether the preliminary
injunction was sufficiently supported, the court held that the district court's reasons
were adduced.

III. LEGAL HISTORY
The issue in Six Clinics Holding Corporation,H v. Cafcomp Systems, Inc.,2 5 is
whether a federal court can enjoin an arbitration proceeding. The court determined
that it did have authority to order an injunction because the arbitration was not a state
court proceeding within the meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act.26 A discussion of
the Act and its historical relation to arbitration proceedings will provide insight to
this decision.
The purpose of the Anti-Injunction Act is a "desire to avoid direct conflicts
between state and federal courts" by preventing federal courts from interfering with
state court actions.27 The Act was originally a section of the Judicial Code and
provided only one specific exception allowing federal injunctions relating to
bankruptcy proceedings. 28 The rule was recognized and revised in Title 28 of the
United States Code in 1948 to include three general exceptions and labeled as the
Anti-Injunction Act.29 Under the Act, a court of the United States may enjoin a state
proceeding if expressly authorized by Act of Congress, necessary in aid of its
30
jurisdiction, or necessary to protect or effectuate its judgments.
Case law indicates that courts have strictly construed the three exceptions to the
Anti-Injunction Act. In Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman
Brothers, the court stated that the Act is "not a statute conveying a broad general
policy for appropriate ad hoc application" but is clearly defined by specific
exceptions. 31 In Roodveldt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 32 the
court evaluated a request to enjoin a state order and require arbitration to resolve the
dispute. The court found that the matter met the third exception under the AntiInjunction Act, to "protect or effectuate the United States' court judgments," and
permitted the district court to enjoin the state order. 3 However, the court added a
requirement to the exceptions that "a party must demonstrate sufficient need to be
entitled to relief under the relitigation doctrine., 34 The court in Roodveldt held that
although the exception was met, the plaintiff did not indicate a sufficient need for the

24. Id. at 400-402. The court concluded that the district court adequately stated reasons for
granting the preliminary injunction by referencing specific evidence "that ARN was likely to succeed
on the merits of its claim that Cafcomp was a fiduciary" and that ARN was entitled to a preliminary
injunction.
25. Id. at 393.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 518.
28. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Brothers, 348 U.S. 511,514 (1955).
29. Id.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (West 1997).
31. Id. at 516.
32. 585 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
33. Id. at 782 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2283).
34. Id. at 783.
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injunction
and so it was denied and a separate order was made for the arbitration
35
request.
Case law clearly indicates that the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act are
strictly construed to prevent federal courts from interfering with state proceedings.
In some cases, courts have looked to the nature of the action rather than the
exceptions to avoid the Anti-Injunction law. In Roudebush v. Hartke,36 a United
States Senator sought an injunction against a state court order for a recount of the
election in which he was appointed. In determining the enjoinder issue under the
Anti-Injunction Act, the court held that the recount procedure was not a state court
proceeding within the meaning of the Act.37 The court reasoned that "not every state
court function involves 'litigation' or 'legal controversies'" and that the Act does not
restrict injunctions for proceedings of non-judicial functions.38
In another attempt to avoid the Anti-Injunction Act, Kelly v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,39 found that federal courts have broad injunctive
powers to protect their own judgments. 40 This court held that the broad powers
included authority to enjoin arbitrations to prevent re-litigation. In addition, the
court stated that the Anti-Injunction Act merely creates an exception to the broad
41
injunctive powers rather than "authorizing an exclusive class of injunctions.'
Although the Anti-Injunction Act prohibits injunctions for state court
proceedings, the exceptions and interpretation of the types of proceedings covered
within the Act have enabled courts to escape the mandate against injunctions in
certain instances. Six Clinics focused on the nature of the arbitrations as in
Roudebush and Kelly to permit the court to enjoin the arbitration at issue.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
Six Clinics recognized the Anti-Injunction Act but determined that it did not
restrict injunctions in this case because it only applied to proceedings in a state
court.42 The court relied heavily on Roudebush v. Hartke, which held that a nonenjoinable proceeding was one of judicial inquiry as opposed to administrative
proceedings and thus not covered under the Act.43 Following Roudebush, the court
held that there are state actions which are enjoinable and not covered under the AntiInjunction Act."
After indicating that the Act only applies to certain state proceedings, the court
reasoned that an arbitration proceeding is not the type of proceeding covered under

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 784.
405 U.S. 15 (1972).
Id. at 23.
Id. at 20-21 (citing Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908)).
985 F. 2d 1067 (11 th Cir. 1993).
Id. At 1069 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994)).
Id. at 1069.
Six Clinics, 119 F.3d at 398.
Roudebush. 405 U.S. at 21.
Six Clinics, 119 F.3d at 398.
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the Act.45 The court looked at both the policy of the Act and the character of the
arbitration proceeding in determining whether or not the Act governed. 6 First, the
court explained that the purpose of the Act was to "avoid the inevitable friction
between the state and federal courts that ensues from the injunction of state judicial
proceedings by a federal court. 47 The court argued that this policy reason for the
Anti-Injunction Act does not apply to arbitration proceedings which do not affect the
jurisdictional conflicts between state and federal courts. The court also asserted that
arbitration is an alternative method to avoid court resolution and thus is not the type
48
of proceeding intended to be governed by the Act.
The second argument asserted by the court was that the character of the
proceedings determines whether or not the Act should apply. 49 Roudebush provided
an example of such a proceeding that was not covered because it was administrative
in nature rather than judicial50 The court determined that an arbitration is a private
proceeding pursuant to a voluntary agreement to arbitrate rather than submit the
issues in a judicial setting.5 Thus, the private nature of this case indicates that it was
not a state proceeding.52
Because the court determined that the Act did not apply to this case where an
arbitration was agreed to by the parties, it did not decide whether an arbitration
ordered or acted on by a state court meets the Anti-Injunction Act's definition of an
applicable proceeding. 3 In addition, the court did not discuss whether the exceptions
of the Act could authorize a federal court to order an injunction on an arbitration
proceeding covered under the Act.M The court only determined that the Act does not
apply "where an arbitration proceeding is private and voluntary, and the state courts
have not become involved, and may never become involved." 5

V. COMMENT
The precedential cases considering the right of federal courts to enjoin state
court proceedings indicate that courts are reluctant to allow injunctions unless they
meet the strict guidelines of the exceptions to the Act. More recent cases indicate
a trend that Six Clinics followed that looks to the nature of the proceeding rather than
the exceptions in order to find justification for enjoining arbitrations and other nonjudicial proceedings. To support this broad interpretation, Six Clinics relied on
Roudebush v. Harke, in which an election recount was enjoined because the
proceeding was characterized as administrative rather than judicial.5 6 Although

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Roudebush, 405 U.S. at 20-21.
Six Clinics, 119 F.3d at 398.
Id.
Id. at 399.

54. Id.

55. Id.
56. Id. at 398.
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arbitration proceedings are non-judicial and generally involve only administrative
roles by state courts like the Roudebush recount, arbitrations also involve a
contractual agreement between two parties to arbitrate "[a]ny controversy or claim
arising out of or relating to this agreement or the breach thereof. 5 7 The importance
of encouraging alternative dispute resolution methods like arbitration depends on the
enforcement of such contractual agreements. The consequences of a broad
interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act in Six Clinics may adversely impact
alternative dispute resolution methods. If the court has unlimited freedom to enjoin
arbitration proceedings, the effect of arbitration agreements will be severely diluted.
The Federal Arbitration Act indicates the strong federal policy of enforcing
private agreements to arbitrate. The Act "leaves no place for the exercise of
discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the
parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has
been signed., 5 8 In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, an investor brought suit
against his broker alleging violations of federal securities law and state law.5 9 Thus,
as in Six Clinics, we have a bifurcation of arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims arising
out of the same transaction. The Supreme Court in Dean Witter held that the district
court had erred in refusing to compel arbitration of the state claims. 60 The Court
concluded that the plain meaning and federal policy reflected in the Arbitration Act
"requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to arbitrate, and 'not substitute
[its] own views of economy and efficiency for those of Congress'."61 In addition,
the House report accompanying the Arbitration Act clearly states that its purpose
was "to place an arbitration agreement 'upon the same footing as other contracts,
where it belongs'.
Six Clinics undermines the enforceability of arbitration agreements by stating
that they are not judicial proceedings protected under the Anti-Injunction Act. The
parties in Six Clinics agreed to arbitrate all claims or controversies and incurred any
risks that might ensue from this bargained arrangement. By allowing courts to
prevent private arbitration agreements from proceeding, the significance of such
agreements as valid, irrevocable and enforceable contracts is eroded.
Although the best scenario in Six Clinics would be an enforcement of the
arbitration proceedings, some courts have used an alternative to an injunction. In
Pensacola Construction Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., the court
suggested using declaratory judgments as an alternative remedy to the harsh results
of injunctions on arbitration proceedings in order to protect a third party to an
arbitration agreement.63 The court stated that "Congress plainly intended declaratory
relief to act as an alternative to the strong medicine of the injunction. ' The court
concluded that a declaratory judgment is the best of both worlds in that it does "not

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 396.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985).
Id. at 214.
Id. at 223-24.
Id. at 217 (quoting Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 646 (7th Cir. 1981)).
Id. at 219 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924)).
705 F. Supp. 306, 309-11 (W.D. La. 1988).
Id. at 310 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466 (1974)).
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interfere with the arbitration proceedings
and it protects the non-arbitrable rights of
65
the parties before this court.,
In fact, the "express purpose of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act was to
provide a milder alternative to the injunctive remedy. 66 The Senate report offers
insight into the benefits of the declaratory judgment:
The declaratory judgment differs in no essential respect from any other
judgment except that it is not followed by a decree for damages,
injunction, specific performance, or other immediately coercive decree.
It declares conclusively and finally the rights of the parties in litigations
over a contested issue, a form of relief which often suffices to settle
controversies and fully administer justice

... The

procedure has been

especially useful in avoiding the necessity, now so often present of...
67
abandon[ing] one's rights because of a fear of incurring damages.
In addition, the prerequisites for injunctive and declaratory judgment relief are
different in that irreparable injury need not be shown in a suit for declaratory relief
and the result is merely a "declaration of legal status and rights; it neither mandates
' 68
nor prohibits state action.
In order to determine whether declaratory relief is permissible, the facts of the
case in question must indicate a "substantial controversy, between parties having
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance
of a declaratory judgment."69 Also, the general rule is that declaratory judgments
may only be issued when an injunction may be issued, in other words, when there
is no pending state proceeding.7 ° Therefore, if an injunction would be barred by the
Anti-Injunction Act, declaratory judgments with the same effect would also be
barred.7' The crucial issue in determining whether a declaratory judgment would
violate the Anti-Injunction Act is whether a state court proceeding is pending.72
The Six Clinics court faced the same issue of determining whether arbitration
proceedings were state proceedings and thus subject to the Anti-Injunction Act. The
court determined that an injunction could be granted because arbitrations pursuant
to private agreements are not state court proceedings. 73 According to Texas
Employers' InsuranceAssociation, if the court allowed an injunction it could also
have issued a declaratory injunction.74
In evaluating the requirements for declaratory judgment, there must be a
substantial controversy between the parties and an immediate need for a declaration
of the parties' rights. 75 There was a substantial controversy between Cafcomp and
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at311.
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111 (1971).
Id. at 112 (quoting S.Rep. No. 73-1005, at 2-3, 6(1934)).
Id.at 124.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 116-17.
Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491, 507 (5th Cir. 1988).
Id.
Six Clinics, 119 F.3d at 398-99.
Texas Employers 'Ins. Association, 862 F.2d at507.
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. at 102.
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ARN with a breach of contract claim against ARN and a counterclaim against
Cafcomp for violating an Internal Revenue Service Code and fiduciary duties under
ERISA. In addition, there was an immediate need for a judgment on ARN's
counterclaim because the arbitration panel dismissed the counterclaim for lack of
jurisdiction. If the arbitration were to continue without a judgment on the validity
of ARN's counterclaim, it would have been precluded by res judicata in future
litigation. This indicates a perfect case for declaratory judgment where there are
adverse claimants and an immediate need for judgment to avoid a loss of one party's
rights.
An injunction is a permissible decision but its harsh results in interfering with
the arbitration proceeding could have been avoided by entering a declaratory
judgment in this case. The declaratory judgment would resolve ARN's federal nonarbitrable claim. However, it would not interfere with the arbitrable breach of
contract claims. In essence, a declaratory judgment does not have the same forceful
sting as an injunction, which prevents a contracted arbitration between parties.

VI. CONCLUSION
Six Clinics enjoined a private arbitration agreement by holding that it was not
a state court proceeding protected under the Anti-Injunction Act. By evading the
Anti-Injunction Act and preventing the enforcement of a valid contract with a
technicality, the court undermined the effectiveness of the arbitration process. Even
if the court believed that the federal matter should be resolved for equity reasons, a
declaratory judgment may have lessened the impact on the arbitration agreement.
The real issue in this case should not have been whether or not an arbitration was a
state proceeding within the meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act, but rather under
what circumstances can a court refuse to uphold a valid contractual right of
arbitration.
HEIDI ALBERS
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